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INCORPORATING NY LAND BANKS INTO
THE DELINQUENT PROPERTY TAX
ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES
By J. Justin Woods*
I. INTRODUCTION
Communities across the country have struggled for decades with the
impacts of deindustrialization, economic decline, suburban sprawl, white
ight, population loss, and urban decay, resulting in vacant and blighted
properties concentrated in formerly bustling urban cores.1 Vacant and
blighted properties are not mere nusiances for community residents, they
also create costs and liabilities for local govements while simultaneously
undermining a community’s tax base.2 For example, a recent study of a
particular census track in Rochester, New York concluded that “for every
additional vacant building in the Census Block Group where a property is
located, the house price is expected to decrease by about $3,000.”3 Sprout-
ing from eorts associated with the National Vacant Properties Cam-
paign4 and its successor, the Center for Community Progress,5 land banks
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have evolved and emerged into an innovative tool for
communities to address the problems of vacant and
blighted properties.6
In 2011, the New York State Land Bank Act (LBA)
created a statutory framework for land banks in New
York.7 The most pressing concern shared by New York
land bank representatives is how to secure recurring
and stable funding. This article discusses land banking
as critical tool for communities to address vacant prop-
erties and urban blight. It provides a brief history of
how land banks have evolved and reviews the status of
land banks in New York. Specically, the article re-
views the broad statutory authority granted in the en-
abling legislation and argues that municipalities should
exercise these powers to incorporate land banks directly
into the delinquent property tax enforcement processes.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND—THE
EVOLUTION OF LAND BANKS
Land banks are public authorities or special purpose
nonprot organizations created to act as a legal and
nancial conduit to transform, hold, manage, repurpose,
and develop vacant, abandoned, tax-foreclosed and
other problem properties discarded or underutilized by
the private market.8 Successful land bank programs
revitalize blighted neighborhoods and direct reinvest-
ment back into these neighborhoods to support their
long-term community revitalization.9
There are approximately 120 land banks and land
banking programs throughout the nation.10 In Land
Banks and Land Banking, Emory Law Professor Frank
Alexander, outlines the evolution of land banks through
three stages. The rst generation of land banks were
founded between 1971 and 1991 in St. Louis, Clevland,
Louisville, and Atlanta. They had a common focus on
addressing abandoned and tax delinquent properties,
but lacked the capacity to eciently and eectively
manage and dispose of properties. Most signicantly,
they lacked a dedicated source of funding, and were
further hampered by property tax foreclosure laws that
created several impediments to securing and disposing
of properties with marketable title.11
The second generation of land banks were estab-
lished in Michigan and Ohio from 1999 through 2010.
These eorts were accompanied by “much more exten-
sive intervention in the property tax foreclosure pro-
cess, and in the case of Michigan, the ability to acquire
all tax foreclosed properties, not just properties for
which there is no third-party investor ready to purchase
it.”12 The case studies in Genesee County, Michigan
(Flint) and Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Cleveland) provide
some of the most sussessful examples of land banking
in the nation because they structurally created diverse,
dedicated funding streans to fund land bank programs.
However, the shortcoming of second generation land
bank statutes was that they were intricately drafted to
amend several discrete statutory provisions and there-
fore were not easily replicable in other states.13
The New York State Land Bank Act is based on the
third generation land bank model statute developed by
the Center for Community Progress.14 The LBA in-
cludes broad powers for using and nancing land banks,
but like the rst generation land banks, it does not
provide dedicated sources of funding. However, the
exibility of options and broad powers provided for in
the law create opportunities for municipalities to
exercise these powers and replicate the success of
second generation land banks. If municipalities fully
utilize all the tools provided in the law to partner with
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land banks, they can create a nancing stream that can
help sustainably fund land bank operations. One strat-
egy proven eective in other states is incorporating land
banks directly into the delinquent property tax enforce-
ment processes.
III. THE NEW YORK STATE LAND
BANK ACT
Governor Cuomo signed the New York State Land
Bank Act (LBA) into law on July 29, 2011.15 The LBA
amended the Not-For-Prot Corporation Law and cre-
ated Article 16, a statutory framework enabling a
limited number of land banks throughout the state. The
purpose of the LBA is to address the crisis caused by
massive “disinvestment in real property and resulting in
a signicant amount of vacant and abandoned property”
in many cities and metro areas.16
Under New York Law, a land bank is a type C not-
for-prot corporation17 which are formed to pursue pub-
lic or quasi-public objectives.18 While any foreclosing
governmental unit may create a land bank, the New
York State Empire State Development Corporation
(ESD) must approve any new entity.19 Like local devel-
opment corporations, the N.Y. Not-for-Prot Corp. Law
permits great exibility in how land banks can be
structured, including in their degree of independence
from the initiating governmental unit. For example, the
City of Rochester Land Bank is staed by municipal
employees, whereas the Newburgh and Syracuse Land
Banks are staed by independent executive directors
working collaboratively with the municipalities.20 The
composition of the Board of Directors is another area
where the level of independence or interdependence
with the establishing municipality or municipalities
vary greatly.21
A common feature to all New York land banks is that
they are subject to the public reporting requirements
under the NYS Public Authorities Law.22 The Land
Bank Act also requires Land Banks to comply with the
Open Meetings Law and Freedom of Information
Law.23 However, other than these common reporting
requirements, municipalities have great freedom and
exibility to structure land banks, including the ability
to incorporate them into the delinquent tax enforcement
process or to otherwise contract with land banks to
provide a variety of government services.
IV. ENABLING POWERS UNDER THE
LBA
Section 1607 of the LBA outlines specic powers for
land banks.24 Land banks enumerated powers include:
entering into contracts; borrowing money; issuing ne-
gotiable notes and tax-exempt bonds; renting and sell-
ing the land bank’s real property; designing, develop-
ing, constructing, demolishing, reconstructing,
rehabilitating, renovating, relocating, and otherwise
improving real property; entering into partnerships,
joint ventures, and other collaborative relationships
with municipalities and other public and private entities
for the ownership, management, development, and dis-
position of real property; inventorying vacant, aban-
doned, and tax foreclosed properties; developing rede-
velopment plans to be approved by the foreclosing
governmental unit or units; and entering into agree-
ments with a foreclosing governmental unit for the dis-
tribution of revenues to the foreclosing governmental
unit and school district.25
Land banks also have broad authority to acquire and
dispose of real property,26 including “transfers from
municipalities upon such terms and conditions as
agreed to by the land bank and the municipality.”27
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, any
municipality may transfer to the land bank real property
and interests in real property of the municipality on such
terms and conditions and according to such procedures
as determined by the municipality.28 Additionally, land
banks may enter into agreements to purchase any real
property “consistent with an approved redevelopment
plan.”29
V. FUNDING LAND BANKS IN NEW
YORK
To date, there are 10 approved land banks spread
geographically across New York State, and the act has
been amended to authorize an additional 10.30 Land
banks in New York were o to a slow start, but NY At-
torney General Eric Schneiderman catalyzed land bank-
ing in the state by appropriating $33 million from the
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First National Mortgage Settlement award through the
Attorney General’s Land Bank Community Revitaliza-
tion Initiative.31 While the Initiative provides important
seed funding and has enabled New York Land Banks to
begin a number of projects, as noted previously, “the
most pressing concerns shared by land representatives
is how to secure recurring and stable funding.”32 Ac-
cording to Madeline Fletcher, Executive Director of the
Newburgh Land Bank, the biggest priority for New
York land banks is nancial sustainability: “How are all
of these very dierent land banks going to gure out
how they can each operate in a way that enables them
to exist in the long term?”33 This is especially critical as
the state legislature has initiated discussions about us-
ing the mortgage settlement funds to address infrastruc-
ture, jobs, and a variety of other needs across the state.34
Land banks can be funded in a number of ways. The
LBA provides that land banks may receive grants and
loans from public and private sources.35 Land banks
may also “receive and retain payments for services
rendered, for rents and leasehold payments received,
for consideration for disposition of real and personal
property, for proceeds of insurance coverage for losses
incurred, for income from investments, and for any
other asset and activity lawfully permitted.”36 Addition-
ally, any municipality, school district, or taxing district
may authorize that 50% of the real property taxes col-
lected on any specic parcel of real property “be remit-
ted to the land bank, in accordance with procedures
established by regulations promulgated by the NYS
Department of Taxation and Finance. Such allocation
of real property tax revenues commences with the rst
taxable year following the date of conveyance and may
continue for a period of ve years.”37 In practice, land
banks in New York receive their funding through a
combination of private foundation support, local gov-
ernments’ direct allocations, public grants, and proceeds
from the management and disposition of tax-foreclosed
properties.38
A core function of successful land banks in other
states has been integrating land banks into the tax lien
process.39 In this way, land banks serve to limit un-
healthy tax lien speculation that is associated with
traditional tax foreclosure proceedings. In a 2009
interview with the Democracy Collaborative, Congress-
man Dan Kildee (D-MI), former County Treasurer and
CEO of the Land Bank in Genesee County, and Co-
founder and President of the Center for Community
Progress, explained that the initial success of the
Genesee County Land Bank was based on reforming
the tax foreclosure laws to eliminate the tax liens sale to
speculators.40 This change not only allowed the County
and Land Bank to acquire and repurpose properties, but
it also created a dedicated funding stream for land
banks. The important lesson for New York land banks
is that the broad powers included in the LBA authorizes
integrating land banks into the tax foreclosure process,
and the long-term success of land banks in New York
likely depends on eectively utilizing all of the LBA
provisions.
VI. THE DELINQUENT TAX LIEN
OPPORTUNITY
Traditional tax foreclosure processes generally per-
petuate the cycle of unhealthy property ownership,
contributing to the degradation of nearby properties.
Under the LBA, municipalities may sell some or all of
the delinquent tax liens held by it to a land bank, subject
to the following conditions:
i. The consideration paid may be more or less than
the face amount of the tax liens sold,41
ii. Property owners must be given at least 30 days
advance notice of the sale as provided by Real
Property Tax Law § 1190(2),42
iii. The municipality may repurchase a lien or liens
on the foreclosure list from a land bank,43
iv. The sale of a tax lien pursuant to the Act does not
shorten the applicable redemption period or
change the applicable interest rate,44 and
v. If a municipality does not tender a bid, the land
bank may tender a bid at a judicially ordered sale
conducted pursuant to Real Property Tax Law
§ 1136 in an amount equal to the total amount of
all municipal claims and liens which were the
basis for the judgment. Such a bid by a land bank
trumps any bids by any other third parties.45
Of particular signicance are the enumerated powers
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that authorize land banks to: 1) enter into intergovern-
mental agreements for the joint exercise of municipal
functions;46 2) contract to perform functions by the land
bank on behalf of the municipalities;47 and 3) enter into
partnership, joint ventures, and other collaborative
relationships with municipalities and other public and
private entities for the ownership, management, devel-
opment, and disposition of real property.48 These
enumerated powers, when combined with nancing
mechanisms permitting land banks to: 1) receive pay-
ment for services;49 2) share new tax revenue on prop-
erties emerging from land banks;50 and 3) contract to
receive all tax liens from municipality,51 collectively
create the statutorty authority to structure and nance
land banks in a number of creative ways. However the
impetus is on municipalities to fully utilize all the LBA
powers included in the enabling legislation to not only
create land bank programs, but also to establish them
with the necessary funding and authority to succeed.
Such programs should include sharing municipal and
school tax revenues from emerging properties for ve
years and integrating land banks into their delinquent
property tax enforcement process. Other considerations
may also include contracting with the Land Bank to
handle the entire tax enforcement program on behalf of
a municipality or managing the maintenance and upkeep
of properties in various stages of the process.
VII. DELINQUENT PROPERTY TAX
ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK
In order to understand how municipalities can ef-
fectively integrate land banks into the delinquent prop-
erty tax enforcement process, it is helpful to review how
the New York tax enforcement process works. In New
York State, tax enforcement is the responsibility of lo-
cal governments. Counties and cities generally enforce
their own delinquent taxes, as well as the unpaid taxes
of taxing districts such as school districts and towns.
Villages are responsible for enforcing their own taxes
unless the county has agreed to accept the responsibil-
ity, and towns generally refer their unpaid taxes to their
counties. Most municipalities are subject to the tax
enforcement system established by Article 11 of the
Real Property Tax Law. However, there are approxi-
mately 20 New York municipalities that have either
“opted out” of Article 11 or otherwise received special
legislation to operate outside of Article 11.52
1. ARTICLE 11 OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX
LAW—IN REM FORECLOSURE53
Article 11, which governs most of the municipal tax
enforcement processes in the state, provides for a tax
enforcement process in four phases: 1) collection, 2)
redemption, 3) intermediate, and, if necessary, 4)
foreclosure.54 The collection phase begins when taxes
are levied upon the assessment roll. A warrant is then
issued and attached to the assessment roll, which
becomes the tax roll. Then, the tax roll and warrant are
delivered to the collecting ocer, tax bills are issued,
and the collecting ocer accepts payments from
taxpayers. Taxes become liens on the rst day of the
scal year when they are due based on the latest ap-
plicable lien dates.55 When taxes for the current scal
year remain unpaid, the collecting ocer is required to
issue a notice of unpaid taxes shortly before the warrant
expires.56 After the collecting ocers’ warrants expire,
each collecting ocer prepares and submits to the
Enforcing Ocer a Return of Unpaid Taxes, which
identies the parcels on which taxes remain due, and
the unpaid taxes are now considered delinquent.57
Article 11 establishes a standard redemption period
of two years after the lien date.58 To redeem a parcel
from a delinquent tax lien, the delinquent taxes must be
paid, together with all “charges” which have been added
to the amount due pursuant to law. The term “charges”
includes such items as interest, penalties, and mailing
and publication costs.59 When there are delinquent tax
liens from two or more years against the same parcel,
the liens do not all have to be redeemed at the same
time.60 However, if the liens are redeemed individually,
they must be redeemed in “reverse chronological order,
so that the lien with the most recent lien date is re-
deemed rst, and the lien with the earliest lien date is
redeemed last.”61 A tax district may also adopt a local
law allowing taxpayers to enter into agreements to make
installment payments of delinquent taxes.62
The intermediate phase begins when the requisite
List of Delinquent Taxes is led in the Oce of the
County Clerk.63 The ling of the List creates a Notice
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of Pendency against each parcel described on the List,
so that anyone taking an interest thereafter will be
charged with notice of the tax lien. The ling of the No-
tice of Pendency does not commence the foreclosure
proceeding; the proceeding is commenced later, when a
Petition of Foreclosure is led. When a parcel is re-
deemed after the List of Delinquent Taxes has been
led, the taxpayer may ask the Enforcing Ocer to is-
sue a Certicate of Redemption.64
The fourth phase, foreclosure proceedings, are com-
menced by ling a Petition of Foreclosure with the
Supreme Court or County Court, three months before
the end of the redemption period.65 The relevant pages
of the Petition must be served upon the owner and any
other party with a substantial, legally protected interest
of record,66 and published in two newspapers in each of
three nonconsecutive weeks in a two month period.67
When the redemption period ends, the court will deter-
mine the rights of the parties in any parcels that have
not been redeemed.68 Generally, if no answer has been
led, judgment will be taken by default, and the court
will issue an Order directing the Enforcing Ocer to
execute a deed conveying absolute title to the tax
district.69 Once a tax district has taken title to tax delin-
quent property pursuant to court order, it may sell the
property either with or without advertising for bids, but
the legislative body of the tax district must approve the
sale, unless the sale was made to the highest bidder at a
public auction.70
2. TAX ENFORCEMENT IN OPT-OUT
MUNICIPALITIES71
As noted above, there are approximately 20 New
York municipalities that have either “opted out” of
Article 11 or received special legislation to operate
outside of Article 11. The Cities of Syracuse and Roch-
ester are among the opt-out communities that also have
approved land banks. Interestingly, the Greater Syra-
cuse Land Bank is comprised of city and county taxing
districts under which the County is governed by Article
11 and the City is opted out. Therefore, the integration
of multijurisdictional land banks will necessarily
involve agreements specic to each of the foreclosing
governmental units.
The primary methods of delinquent property tax
enforcement utilized among the various opt-out munici-
palities in New York include: 1) Sales of real estate for
taxes; 2) Individual sales of tax liens; 3) In rem foreclo-
sures and sale of real estate; and 4) Bulk tax lien sales
including securitizations.
First, a majority of municipalities that opted out of
Article 11 use a yearly auction of individual parcels of
tax delinquent real estate to enforce delinquent taxes.
The common thread is that each municipality provides
for the individual auction sale of an interest bearing
instrument that represents an interest in a tax delinquent
parcel. If that instrument is not paid in accordance with
its terms (i.e. if the taxes are not redeemed by the end of
the postsale redemption period), the holder of that
instrument may request the issuance of a Treasurer’s
Deed to the property. The potential advantage some opt-
out municipalities like the Cites Canandaigua, Long
Beach, and Syracuse, have is that they have a locally
established a one year redemption period, cutting
almost in half the time required to foreclose a property.
Amending Article 11 to reduce the statutory redemp-
tion period to one year should be part of any package of
reforms land bank advocates propose to the legislature.
Second, Yonkers sells individual tax liens at an an-
nual auction in order to enforce delinquent taxes.
Yonkers sends only one notice to taxpayers: the notice
of tax due. That notice includes the amount due, when
payable, interest accrual after payment date, and date of
the tax lien sale if not redeemed prior to sale. The only
other notice is intended to advertise the lien sale and is
published in newspapers and on the Yonkers Web site.
The lien purchaser may initiate foreclosure by judicial
process, anytime commencing 21 months after the sale
if no interest is paid at the bid interest rate, and after
three years if the then accrued bid rate interest has been
paid but full redemption has not been paid.
Third, Johnstown and Mount Vernon use a yearly in
rem foreclosure proceeding as the primary method of
delinquent tax enforcement. All tax delinquent proper-
ties that do not redeem are sold at foreclosure auction to
the highest bidder.
Lastly, up until last year, Rochester was the only city
apart from New York City that still sold its tax liens in
bulk. However, the Rochester Mayor permitted the
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contract with the bulk lien purchaser to expire follow-
ing the completion of the Center for Community Prog-
ress Report.72 The bulk tax lien sale by New York City
is to a special purpose entity that in turn sells invest-
ment certicates secured by the tax liens to third party
investors. New York City retains the services of spe-
cialized collection agents to handle all taxpayer com-
munications and payments and to manage and supervise
the activity of foreclosure attorneys. The only legal
enforcement method available to the special purpose
entity is judicial foreclosure.
VIII. INTEGRATING LAND BANKS INTO
DELINQUENT TAX ENFORCEMENT
Regardless of whether a taxing district is governed
by Article 11 or locally adopted opt-out provisions,
municipalities with Land Banks can use the LBA to
internalize and capture all the penalties and interests
from tax liens by contracting all the liens or tax sales to
the land bank. The land bank can then use the proceeds
to creates a delinquent tax revolving loan fund. A delin-
quent tax RLF would consist of land bank borrowing or
bonding the capital to pay for the delinquent taxes,
preferably at a reduced rate. In exchange, the land bank
would receive control of all the tax liens and delinquent
proprerties, including any interest and penalties.73
Under such a contract, the land bank, rather than tax
lien speculators, would retain interest and penalties paid
on properties whose taxes are redeemed. It would also
retain the tax lien on any properties not reclaimed.
If a municipality contracts with a land bank to retain
control of all the liens, municipalities can save main-
tanance and carrying costs associated with the
properties. In return, land banks can use the equity and
revenues from redeemed or valuable foreclosed proper-
ties to stabilize and prepare upside-down properties for
redevelopment. A similar cross-subsidy approach was
used in Michigan to create statutory ties between a land
bank and a municipality’s tax foreclosure process by
eliminating the sale of tax liens to speculators through
mandatory public auctions and replacing them with in
rem judicial foreclosure. After foreclosure, all or
substantially all of the properties are transferred to the
land bank.74 By utilizing the Land Bank Act, a munici-
pality can now use the enumerated powers to transfer
all delinquent liens or properties to its land bank and
can secure similar cross-subsidy benets enabling New
York Land banks to more eetively achieve their
redevelopment goals. However, it is worth noting that
this model only works when the land banks acquire the
valuable properties in addition to properites with little
or no value.
IX. BARRIERS TO INTEGRATING LAND
BANKS INTO TAX ENFORCEMENT
Many municipalities receive unpaid property tax rev-
enue from tax lien sales or auctions of delinquent
properties. Some municipal nance ocers, managers,
and elected ocials are understandably reluctant to turn
over these revenues to land banks because it could
impact municipal budgets.75 Municipal nance ocials
are also wary of transferring properties to a land bank
where the land may be held tax free instead of granted
to a private party who would immediately have to pay
taxes. Collectively the municipal obstacles to integrat-
ing land banks into delinquent property tax enforce-
ment is shifting the timeframe of policy decisions to
focus more on long-term outcomes over short-term
budget impacts.
Additionally, vocal opposition to a municipality
contracting all liens and transferring all foreclosed
properties to land banks comes from private tax liens
investors and real estate speculators. Tax lien investors
reap signicant revenues in the form of interests and
penalties generated from acquiring liens and in ex-
change for their investments. Real estate speculators
and private developers also often secure below market
properties at auctions or tax sale foreclosures and thus
make signicant returns on their investments even if
they do not rehabilitate or reinvest in the properties.76
Given the signicant prots at stake, often times, these
investors exert political pressure on elected and ap-
pointed ocials to maintain the status quo. Such moves
may boost private prots in the short term, but too often
at the expense of real innovation and community
revitalization.
The history of government sale of tax liens does not
produce successful results for communities.77 While the
private investors’ concerns are valid as they relate to
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their own economic interests, the policy question that
municipalities should focus on is how to deal with
concentrated blight exacerbated by a scarcity of trans-
formational investment. Tax lien investors push private
market solutions in order to maximize their returns.
These investors are under no obligation to foreclose,
stabilize, or reinvest in properties. Additionally, com-
munities retain little or no control over how or when
properties granted to private investors will or may be
rehabilitated.78 Even in instances where such guarantees
and performances are secured by contract or deed
restrictions, they are frequently ignored and rarely
enforced.
The concerns of municipal nancial ocials, manag-
ers, and elected ocials are understandable given the
short-term nancial troubles many communities face.
However, communities nd themselves faced with
policy focuses that are increasingly demanding short-
term results; innovation and community investment too
often suer as a result. In this context, political and
long-term community and economic interests are
decoupled. By transferring tax liens or foreclosed prop-
erties to a land bank, the community can embark on
strategy that is consistent with both the short-term and
long-term benets to the community. In the short-term,
delinquent taxes are covered or municipal costs may be
reduced, and the land bank retains control of the prop-
erty to redevelop or repurpose it for long term goals
community goals, including returning it to productive
uses consistent with community-based redevelopment
plans. This is accomplished while retaining what would
be the investment speculator’s low risk prots and
reinvesting tax lien proceeds back into community
revitalization initiatives. Professor Alexander sums up
the policy choice simply:
The most inecient and ineective tax foreclosure
systems are those that transfer 100% of potential surplus
to investors or speculators who have no obligations to
the public or common good, leaving the local govern-
ment to acquire and manage only those properties that
truly have negative value. The contest here is not with
owners who wish to pay their taxes and avoid losing
their homes. It is between private investors and the
neighborhoods and communities where the property is
located. The policy choice is whether private investors
are allowed to reap the prots from high rate of interest
and penalties, and surplus value, leaving the neighbor-
hoods and communities with the greatest liabilities, or
whether the local government exercises its core power
of taxation in a manner that serves the common good.79
Further, while other cities’ land bank programs, like
St. Louis (MO), have been used primarily as a scal
tool to stimulate growth in their communities, Genesee
County (MI)’s land bank program has been used as a
planning tool to align with their communities’ long-
term redevelopment plans and property disposition to
ensure foreclosed properties have the greatest benet.80
If New York municipalities use their LBA powers fully,
local and regional land bank eorts can become a vital
tools for planning and implementing community revital-
ization programs. Land banks should become city and
regional planning partners advancing smart growth by
countering sprawl and revitalizing the inner core of
New York’s cities and villages. Taken together, munici-
pally contracting all tax liens to the land bank could
generate an important funding source to cover the land
bank’s operations while simultaneously maximizing the
land bank’s ability to use foreclosed properties with
equity to subsidize the redevelopment or demolition of
properties with no eective value.
X. CONCLUSION
The New York State Land Bank Act created a ex-
ible statutory framework for Land Banks in New York.
Programs are o to a good start, but the most pressing
concerns shared by land representatives involve secur-
ing consistent and stable funding. Communities should
utilize the expansive Land Bank powers to transfer all
tax liens and foreclosed properties to their local land
bank. Doing so will generate an important funding
source that will help cover the land bank’s operations
while simultanesouly maximizing the land bank’s abil-
ity to reinvest lien proceeds and any equity into redevel-
oping or demolishing properties with little or no value.
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